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Abstract Individual differences in cognitive paradigms are
increasingly employed to relate cognition to brain structure,
chemistry, and function. However, such efforts are often un-
fruitful, even with the most well established tasks. Here we
offer an explanation for failures in the application of robust
cognitive paradigms to the study of individual differences.
Experimental effects become well established – and thus those
tasks become popular – when between-subject variability is
low. However, low between-subject variability causes low re-
liability for individual differences, destroying replicable corre-
lations with other factors and potentially undermining pub-
lished conclusions drawn from correlational relationships.
Though these statistical issues have a long history in psychol-
ogy, they are widely overlooked in cognitive psychology and
neuroscience today. In three studies, we assessed test-retest
reliability of seven classic tasks: Eriksen Flanker, Stroop,
stop-signal, go/no-go, Posner cueing, Navon, and Spatial-
Numerical Association of Response Code (SNARC).
Reliabilities ranged from 0 to .82, being surprisingly low for
most tasks given their common use. As we predicted, this
emerged from low variance between individuals rather than
high measurement variance. In other words, the very reason
such tasks produce robust and easily replicable experimental
effects – low between-participant variability – makes their use
as correlational tools problematic. We demonstrate that taking
such reliability estimates into account has the potential to qual-
itatively change theoretical conclusions. The implications of
our findings are that well-established approaches in experimen-
tal psychology and neuropsychology may not directly translate
to the study of individual differences in brain structure, chem-
istry, and function, and alternative metrics may be required.
Keywords Reliability . Individual differences . Reaction
time . Difference scores . Response control
Individual differences have been an annoyance rather
than a challenge to the experimenter. His goal is to
control behavior, and variation within treatments is
proof that he has not succeeded… For reasons both
statistical and philosophical, error variance is to be
reduced by any possible device. (Cronbach, 1957, p.
674)
The discipline of psychology consists of two historically
distinct approaches to the understanding of human behavior:
the correlational approach and the experimental approach
(Cronbach, 1957). The division between experimental and
correlational approaches was highlighted as a failing by some
theorists (Cronbach, 1957; Hull, 1945), whilst others suggest
that it may be the inevitable consequence of fundamentally
different levels of explanation (Borsboom, Kievit, Cervone,
& Hood, 2009). The correlational, or individual differences,
approach examines factors that distinguish between individ-
uals within a population (i.e., between-subject variance).
Alternatively, the experimental approach aims to precisely
characterize a cognitive mechanism based on the typical or
average response to a manipulation of environmental
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variables (i.e., within-subject variance). Cronbach (1957)
called for an integration between the disciplines, with the view
that a mature science of human behavior and brain function
would consist of frameworks accounting for both inter- and
intra-individual variation. Whilst a full integration is far from
being realized, it is becoming increasingly common to see
examinations of the neural, genetic, and behavioral correlates
of performance on tasks with their origins in experimental
research (e.g., Chen et al., 2015; Crosbie et al., 2013;
Forstmann et al., 2012; Marhe, Luijten, van de Wetering,
Smits, & Franken, 2013; L. Sharma, Markon, & Clark,
2014; Sumner, Edden, Bompas, Evans, & Singh, 2010).
Such integration is not without obstacles (e.g., Boy &
Sumner, 2014). Here, we highlight a general methodological
consequence of the historical divide between experimental
and correlational research. Specifically we ask whether tasks
with proven pedigree as Breliable^ workhorses in the tradition
of experimental research are inevitably unsuitable for correla-
tional research, where Breliable^ means something different.
This issue is likely to be ubiquitous across all domains where
robust experimental tasks have been drawn into correlational
studies, under the implicit assumption that a robust experi-
mental effect will serve well as an objective measure of indi-
vidual variation. This has occurred, for example, to examine
individual differences in cognitive function, brain structure,
and genetic risk factors in neuropsychological conditions
(e.g.. Barch, Carter, & Comm, 2008), or where individual
difference analyses are performed as supplementary analyses
in within-subject studies (c.f. Yarkoni & Braver, 2010). Many
of the issues we discuss reflect long-recognized tensions in
psychological measurement (Cronbach & Furby, 1970;
Lord, 1956), though they are rarely discussed in contemporary
literature. The consequences of this are that researchers often
encounter difficulty when trying to translate state-of-the art
experimental methods to studying individual differences
(e.g., Ross, Richler, & Gauthier, 2015). By elucidating these
issues in tasks used prominently in both experimental and
correlational contexts, we hope to aid researchers looking to
examine behavior from both perspectives.
The reliability of experimental effects
Different meanings of reliability For experiments, a Breli-
able^ effect is one that nearly always replicates, one that is
shown by most participants in any study and produces
consistent effect sizes. For example, in the recent BMany
labs 3^ project (Ebersole et al., 2016), which examined
whether effects could be reproduced when the same proce-
dure was run in multiple labs, the Stroop effect was repli
cated in 100% of attempts, compared to much lower rates
for most effects tested.In the context of correlational re-
search, reliability refers to the extent to which a measure
consistently ranks individuals. This meaning of reliability
is a fundamental consideration for individual differences
research because the reliability of two measures limits the
correlation that can be observed between them (Nunnally,
1970; Spearman, 1904). Classical test theory assumes that
individuals have some Btrue^ value on the dimension of
interest, and the measurements we observe reflect their true
score plus measurement error (Novick, 1966). In practice,
we do not know an individual’s true score, thus, reliability
depends on the ability to consistently rank individuals at
two or more time points. Reliability is typically assessed
with statistics like the IntraClass Correlation (ICC), which
takes the form:
ICC ¼ Variance between individuals
Variance between individuals þ Error variance þ Variance between sessions
1Here, variance between sessions corresponds to systemat-
ic changes between sessions across the sample. Error variance
corresponds to non-systematic changes between individuals’
scores between sessions, i.e. the score for some individuals
increases, while it decreases for others. Clearly, reliability de-
creases with higher measurement error, whilst holding vari-
ance between participants constant. Critically, reliability also
decreases for smaller between-participant variance, whilst
holding error variance constant. In other words, for two mea-
sures with identical Bmeasurement error,^ there will be lower
reliability for the measure with more homogeneity. Measures
with poor reliability are ill-suited to correlational research, as
the ability to detect relationships with other constructs will be
compromised by the inability to effectively distinguish be-
tween individuals on that dimension (Spearman, 1910).
In contrast to the requirements for individual differences,
homogeneity is the ideal for experimental research. Whereas
variance between individuals is the numerator in the ICC for-
mula above, it appears as the denominator in the t-test (i.e., the
standard error of the mean). For an experimental task to pro-
duce robust and replicable results, it is disadvantageous for
there to be large variation in the within-subject effect.
1 The two-way ICC can be calculated for absolute agreement or for consisten-
cy of agreement. The latter omits the between-session variance term. Note also
that the error variance term does not distinguish between measurement error
and non-systematic changes in the individuals’ true scores (Heize, 1969).
Some may therefore prefer to think of the coefficient as an indicator of
stability.
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Interestingly, it is possible for us to be perfectly aware of this
for statistical calculations, without realising (as we previously
didn't) that the meanings of a Breliable^ task for experimental
and correlational research are not only different, but can be
opposite in this critical sense.
Present study
The issues we discuss have broad implications for cog-
nitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Recent re-
views have highlighted the potential for individual dif-
ferences approaches to advance our understanding of the
relationship between brain structure and function (Kanai
& Rees, 2011). The way in which we measure and con-
ceptualize cognitive processes has largely been built on
within-subject paradigms, though their strengths in ex-
perimental contexts may make these paradigms sub-
optimal for individual differences. Here, in three studies,
we evaluate the re-test reliability of seven commonly
used and robust tasks, spanning the domains of cognitive
control, attention, processing style, and numerical-spatial
associations. In doing so, we not only provide sorely
needed information on these measures, but also evaluate
the relationship between robust experimental paradigms
and reliable individual differences in real data using co-
hort sizes and trial numbers similar to, or greater than,
most imaging studies. In addition, we illustrate how tak-
ing the reliability of these measures into account has the
power to change the conclusions we draw from statistical
tests.
First, we examined the reliability of the Eriksen flanker
task, Stroop task, go/no-go task, and the stop-signal task,
which we then replicated in Study 2. These tasks are all
considered to be measures of impulsivity, response inhibi-
tion or executive functioning (Friedman & Miyake, 2004;
Stahl et al., 2014). In Study 3, we examined the Posner
cueing task (Posner, 1980), the Navon task (Navon,
1977), and a spatial-numerical association of response
codes (SNARC) effect paradigm (Dehaene, Bossini, &
Giraux, 1993). These tasks are used to measure the con-
structs of attentional orienting, perceptual processing style,
and the automatic association between magnitude and
space (i.e., the Bmental number line^), respectively. These
tasks were selected because they were all originally devel-
oped in experimental contexts, and we believed they would
be familiar to most readers. Further, all these tasks have
since been used in the context of individual differences,
and their underlying neural correlates. A Google Scholar
search for the term Bindividual differences^ within articles
citing the original papers for each task produces at least
400 citations for each. For conciseness, we combine the
reporting of our methods and results across all studies.
Method
Participants
Participants in Study 1 were 50 (three male) undergraduate
students aged 18–21 years (M = 19.5 years, SD=0.9).
Participants in Study 2 were 62 (12 male) undergraduate stu-
dents aged 18–47 years (M = 20.5 years, SD=4.98).
Participants in Study 3 were 42 (five male) undergraduate
students aged 18–40 years (M = 20.4 years, SD=3.5). All
participants gave informed written consent prior to participa-
tion in accordance with the revized Declaration of Helsinki
(2013), and the experiments were approved by the local Ethics
Committee.
Design and procedure
Participants completed the tasks (four in Studies 1 and 2, three
in Study 3) in each of two 90-min sessions taking place 3
weeks apart, at the same time of day. Seven participants in
Study 1 and five participants in Study 2 were unable to attend
their second session exactly 3 weeks later, and were
rescheduled to between 20 and 28 days following their first
session. Each participant completed the tasks in the same or-
der in both of their sessions (in order not to introduce between-
session variance associated with order), and the order of tasks
was counterbalanced across participants using a Latin square.
Though counterbalancing is common practice in experimental
studies, it is often preferable to administer tasks in a fixed
order when correlating variables (though not all do, see e.g.,
Aichert et al., 2012; Wöstmann et al., 2013). However, our
primary focus here was the re-test reliability of the tasks, and a
fixed order could cause one task to appear more reliable than
another due to presentation order rather than the task itself.
Following completion of the tasks, participants completed the
UPPS-P impulsive behavior scale (Lynam, Smith, Whiteside, &
Cyders, 2006;Whiteside &Lynam, 2001), which we commonly
administer in our lab. We include reliability information for the
UPPS-P components as a reference for the levels of reliability
attainable in our sample with a measure constructed for the pur-
pose of measuring individual differences.
Participants were tested in groups of up to nine, at separate
stations in a multi-station lab, separated by dividers. The ex-
perimenter was present throughout the session to monitor
compliance with instructions. Participants were instructed to
be as fast and as accurate as possible in all tasks, and were
given written and verbal instructions before each task. Each
task in Studies 1 and 2 consisted of five blocks of approxi-
mately 4 min each, and participants received feedback about
their average reaction times (RTs) and error rates after each
block. The tasks in Study 3 consisted of four blocks. Figure 1
displays the format of the tasks used. The stop-signal task was
implemented using STOP-IT (Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens,
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2008), all other tasks were implemented in PsychoPy (Peirce,
2007, 2013). An Inter-Stimulus Interval (ISI) of 750 ms was
used for all tasks.
Eriksen flanker task Participants responded to the direction
of a centrally presented arrow (left or right) using the \ and /
keys. On each trial, the central arrow (1 cm × 1 cm) was
flanked above and below by two other symbols separated by
0.75 cm (see, e.g., Boy, Husain, & Sumner, 2010; White,
Ratcliff, & Starns, 2011). Flanking stimuli were arrows
pointing in the same direction as the central arrow (congruent
condition), straight lines (neutral condition), or arrows
pointing in the opposite direction to the central arrow (congru-
ent condition). Stimuli were presented until a response was
given. Participants completed 240 trials in each condition (720
in total). The primary indices of control are the RT cost (in-
congruent RT – congruent RT) and error rate cost (congruent
errors – incongruent errors).
Stroop task Participants responded to the color of a centrally
presented word (Arial, font size 70), which could be red (z
key), blue (x key), green (n key), or yellow (m key). (c.f. Ilan
& Polich, 1999; Macleod, 1991; D. Sharma & McKenna,
1998). The word could be the same as the font color (congru-
ent condition), one of four non-color words (lot, ship, cross,
advice) taken from Friedman and Miyake (2004) matched for
length and frequency (neutral condition), or a color word cor-
responding to one of the other response options (incongruent).
Stimuli were presented until a response was given.
Participants completed 240 trials in each condition (720 in
total). The primary indices of control are the RT cost (incon-
gruent RT – congruent RT) and error rate cost (congruent
errors – incongruent errors).
Go/No-go task Participants were presented with a series of
letters (Arial, font size 70) in the center of the screen. Each
block consisted of four letters, presented with equal probabil-
ity. Participants were instructed to respond with the space bar
to three of the four letters (go trials), and to refrain from
responding if the fourth letter appeared (no-go trials). The
response rule was presented to participants at the beginning
of each block, and displayed at the bottom of the screen
throughout the block to reduce memory demands. A new set
of letters was used for each block, to lessen the impact of
learned, automatic associations (c.f. Verbruggen & Logan,
2008). Stimuli were presented for a fixed duration of 1,250
ms. Participants completed 600 trials in total (75% go). The
primary measures are commission errors (responses to no-go
stimuli), omission errors (non-responses to go stimuli), and
RT to go stimuli.
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of tasks used and their conditions.
Studies 1 and 2 featured the flanker, Stroop, go/no-go and stop-signal
tasks. Study 3 featured the Posner cueing, SNARC and Navon tasks.
Trials were presented intermixed in a randomized order. In the Go/no-
go and Stop-signal tasks, visual stimuli were presented for a fixed
duration of 1,250 ms (c.f. Verbruggen et al., 2008). In all other tasks,
stimuli were presented until a response was given. An Inter-Stimulus
Interval (ISI) of 750 ms was used in all tasks. Stimuli sizes are enlarged
for illustration
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Stop-signal task Participants were instructed to respond to the
identity of a centrally presented stimulus (square or circle:
1.6 cm × 1.6 cm) using the \ and / keys. On 25% of trials (stop
trials), participants heard a tone through a set of headphones
that indicated that they should withhold their response on that
trial. The tone was initially presented 250 ms after the visual
stimulus appeared, and was adjusted using a tracking proce-
dure by which the latency increased by 50 ms following a
successfully withheld response, and decreased by 50 ms fol-
lowing a failure to withhold a response. The latency of the
tone is referred to as the Stop-Signal Delay (SSD). Stimuli
were presented for a fixed duration of 1,250ms. Participants
completed 600 trials in total (75% go). The primary measures
are Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT), and go RT. There are
two common methods of calculating SSRT: the mean method
(SSRTm) and the integration method (SSRTi; Logan, 1981;
Logan & Cowan, 1984). The mean method consists of
subtracting the participant’s mean SSD from their mean go
RT. In the integration method, instead of the mean go RT,
the mean SSD is subtracted from the nth fastest RT, where n
corresponds to the percentage of stop trials on which partici-
pants failed to inhibit their responses. For example, if a par-
ticipant responded on 60% of stop trials, the 60th percentile of
their RT distribution is subtracted from the mean SSD.
Accurate estimation of SSRT using the mean method relies
upon the tracking procedure converging on successful stop-
ping on 50% of stop trials. It has been argued that the integra-
tion method should be favoured when this assumption is not
met, for example, if participants strategically adjust their re-
sponses by slowing down over the course of the session
(Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013). We report the reli-
abilities of both methods here, but restrict subsequent analyses
to only the recommended integration method.
Posner cueing task At the start of each trial, participants
viewed two boxes (6 cm × 6 cm), located 7.5 cm from a
central fixation point to the inside edge. An arrow cue (2 cm
× 1.5 cm) appeared in the center of the screen directing par-
ticipants’ attention to either the left or the right box. After a
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 300, 400, 500, or 600
ms, an X (2 cm × 2 cm) then appeared in the left or right box.
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
with the space bar to the critical stimulus, but to not respond
before it appeared. The cue correctly predicted the location of
the stimulus on 80% of trials, and participants were instructed
of this probability beforehand. The SOAs were chosen to
make the onset of the stimulus unpredictable, and previous
research has shown that the cueing benefit peaks at approxi-
mately 300 ms and is consistent throughout this range of
SOAs (Cheal & Lyon, 1991; Muller & Rabbitt, 1989). If par-
ticipants responded before the stimulus appeared, they were
given feedback lasting 2,500 ms instructing them not to re-
spond prematurely. Participants were instructed to maintain
their fixation on the central fixation point/cue. Participants
completed 640 trials (128 invalid) in total. The key measure
of interest is the difference in RTs to stimuli following valid
compared to invalid cues.
Spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC)
task Participants were required to determine whether a cen-
trally presented white digit (1–9, excluding 5; Arial, font size
70) was greater or less than five. Before each block, partici-
pants were instructed that theywere to respond either such that
Z corresponded to digits less than five and M digits greater
than five, or vice versa. This rule alternated across blocks,
with the first block being counter-balanced across participants,
and participants receiving consistent order in both of their
sessions. As in previous studies (e.g., Rusconi, Dervinis,
Verbruggen, & Chambers, 2013), eight Bbuffer^ trials were
presented at the start of each block to accommodate the
change in response rules. These buffer trials were subsequent-
ly discarded for analysis. Participants were also presented with
feedback if they gave an incorrect response, lasting 1,000 ms.
Participants completed 640 trials in total (320 with each map-
ping), not including buffer trials. The SNARC effect is the key
variable of interest, which is calculated as the difference be-
tween RTs and error rates on trials in which the required re-
sponse aligns with the relative magnitude of the stimulus com-
pared to when they are misaligned. Participants are expected
to respond more quickly to smaller numbers with the left hand
and larger numbers with the right.
Navon task Participants were presented with composite letter
stimuli; large BH^ or BS^ characters (3 cm × 4.5 cm) com-
prised of smaller BS^ or BH^ (0.4 cm × 0.7 cm) characters.
Stimuli could either be consistent, in which the same character
appeared at the global and local levels, or inconsistent (e.g., a
large H composed of smaller S characters). Stimuli were pre-
sented at one of four possible locations and remained on
screen until a response was given. The stimuli were presented
0.5 cm above or below and 2 cm to the left or right of fixation.
Before each block, participants were instructed that they were
to respond to either the global or local character. The response
rule alternated across blocks, and was counter-balanced, as
with the SNARC task. Further, as with the SNARC task, par-
ticipants were presented with eight buffer trials, and feedback
to incorrect response. Participants completed 640 trials in total
(320 per mapping, of which 160 each were consistent and
inconsistent).We derived five effects of interest from this task.
We calculated the difference between congruent RTs for re-
sponses to global versus local stimuli as an indication of par-
ticipants’ bias towards global or local processing (with healthy
participants typically showing a global bias). Further, interfer-
ence effects in both errors and RTs (Incongruent - congruent)
can be derived for global and local stimuli separately.
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UPPS-P impulsive behavior scale The UPPS-P is a 59-item
questionnaire that measures five components of impulsivity:
negative urgency, premeditation, perseverance, sensation seek-
ing, and positive urgency (Lynam et al., 2006; Whiteside &
Lynam, 2001).
Data analysis
Data were not included if participants did not return for
the follow-up session (3,2,2 for the three studies respec-
tively). Participants' data were not analysed for a given
task if they show very low compliance, defined as: accu-
racy below 60% in either session for overall performance
in the flanker, Stroop, Navon, and SNARC tasks, re-
sponses to go stimuli in the go/no-go task, discrimination
performance on go trials in the stop-signal task. For the
Posner task, participants were also required to have antic-
ipatory response rates (i.e., responding before the stimulus
appears) of less than 10%. For the stop signal task, par-
ticipants’ data were not included if their data produced a
negative SSRT, or if they responded on more than 90% of
stop-signal trials in either session, as an SSRT could not
be meaningfully calculated. A participant’s data was re-
moved entirely if they fell below these criteria for two or
more tasks within a single session, otherwise data were
only excluded for the individual task. After these exclu-
sions, 47 and 57 participants remained for the flanker and
go/no-go tasks in Study 1 and 2, respectively, 47 and 56
in the Stroop task, and 45 and 54 in the stop-signal task.
All participants met the inclusion criteria in Study 3. The
calculation of mean RTs excluded RTs below 100 ms and
greater than three times the each individual’s median ab-
solute deviation (Hampel, 1974; Leys, Ley, Klein,
Bernard, & Licata, 2013).
Reliabilities were calculated using Intraclass Correlation
Coefficients (ICC) using a two-way random effects model
for absolute agreement. In the commonly cited Shrout and
Fleiss (1979; see alsoMcGraw&Wong, 1996) nomenclature,
this corresponds to ICC (2,1). This form of the ICC is sensitive
to differences between session means. In Supplementary
Material A, we perform further analyses to account for poten-
tial outliers and distributional assumptions. The choice of sta-
tistic does not affect our conclusions. We report reliabilities
separately for Studies 1 and 2 in the main text so that consis-
tency across samples can be observed.We combine the studies
in supplementary analyses.
As both measurement error and between-participant vari-
ability are important for the interpretation of reliability, we
also report the standard error of measurement (SEM) for each
variable. The SEM is the square root of the error variance term
in the ICC calculation and reflects the 68% confidence interval
around an individual’s observed score.
Summary level data, as well as the raw data for our behav-




Studies 1 and 2 A full report of the descriptive statistics
for each measure can be seen in Supplementary Material B.
All expected experimental effects were observed, and means
and standard deviations for RTs and error rates for all tasks
were comparable to samples from the general population
reported in the literature (see Supplementary Material C).
Thus, despite a possible expectation that students would
show restricted variance, our sample was not consistently
more or less variable than samples taken from the general
population. Scatter plots for the key measures are shown in
Fig. 2.
Study 3 Again, performance was comparable to previous re-
ports in the literature (Navon, 1977; Posner, 1980; Rusconi
et al., 2013). As in Navon’s original study, the conflict effect in
the RTs did not reach significance when participants were
instructed to respond to the global characters and ignore the
local characters – presumably reflecting the preferential pro-
cessing of global features. Scatter plots for the key measures
are shown in Fig. 3.
Task reliabilities
Studies 1 and 2 None of the behavioral measures in
Studies 1 and 2 (see Table 1) exceeded reliabilities of .8,
typically considered excellent or of a clinically required
standard (Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981; Fleiss, 1981; Landis
& Koch, 1977). Two indices of response control exceeded
a standard of good/substantial reliability (.6) in both ses-
sions: the Stroop RT cost (ICCs of .6 and .66 in Studies 1
and 2 respectively) and commission errors on the go/no-
go task (ICC = .76 in both studies). The reliability of the
RT cost scores, calculated by taking the difference be-
tween congruent and incongruent conditions for example,
are generally lower than their components, and we exam-
ine reasons for this below. For example, the flanker RT
cost in Study 1 has a reliably of .4, whereas the RTs for
congruent and incongruent trials have reliabilities of .74
and .66 respectively. This is despite the flanker RT cost
having a relatively low SEM of 15 ms. Thus, measure-
ment error alone does not predict reliability. The scatter
plots in Fig. 2 show the SEMs for the critical measures to
show the size of the error relative to the variance in the
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data.The results for the stop signal task warrant expan-
sion. Large SEMs were observed for Go RT and mean
SSD in Study 1. We suspect that this is due to proactive
slowing in a subset of participants in one session, who did
not strategically adjust their responses in the same way in
the other session. However, despite a reduced SEM and
higher reliability for go RTs in Study 2, the reliability of
SSRT did not increase. Though the integration method of
calculating SSRT was shown by Verbruggen et al. (2013)
to be robust against gradual slowing within a session, it
will remain sensitive to more substantial strategic changes
between sessions (c.f., Leotti & Wager, 2010). Adopting a
more conservative exclusion criterion did not improve up-
on the reliability estimates for SSRTs (see Supplementary
Material A).
Study 3 (see Table 2) Only one behavioral measure had a
reliability in the nominally excellent range (.82): the con-
flict effect when responding to local characters in the
Navon task. An influential data point (an error cost of
43% in both sessions) contributed to this, though the
measure still shows good reliability (.74) if this individ-
ual is excluded.
Fig. 2 Reliability of key
measures from Studies 1 and 2
combined (Total N=99–104). Red
marker indicates mean group
performance from sessions 1 and
2. Error bars show ± 1 standard
error of measurement (SEM). The
SEM is the square root of the error
variance term calculated from the
intraclass correlation, and can be
interpreted as the 68% confidence
interval for an individual’s data
point. A large SEM relative to the
between-subject variance contrib-
utes to poor reliability
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Fig. 3 Reliability of key
measures from Study 3 (N=40).
Red marker indicates mean group
performance from sessions 1 and
2. Error bars show ± 1 standard
error of measurement. RT reaction
time, SNARC Spatial-Numerical
Association of Response Code
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The reliability of the Posner cueing effect was good (.7),
though also influenced by an outlying data point (ICC = .56 if
excluded). The reliabilities for all other behavioral effects of
interest were poor (ICCs <.25).
How many trials should be administered? We found that
the literature on these seven tasks also lacks information to
guide researchers on how many trials to run, and different
studies can choose very different numbers without any explicit
discussion or justification. For those interested in the use of
these tasks for individual differences, we provide information
on the relationship between reliability and trial numbers in
Supplementary Material D.
What happens to variance in within-subject effects?
The relationship between reliability and the sources of vari-
ance in the RT measures is shown in Fig. 4, which plots the
three components of variance from which the ICC is calculat-
ed. Each bar decomposes the relative variance accounted for
by differences between participants (white), differences be-
tween sessions (e.g., practice effects, gray), and error variance
(black). Correlational research (and the ICC) relies on the
proportion of variance accounted for by individual differ-
ences, and the standard subtractions (e.g., to calculate the
Stroop RT cost) do not improve this signal-to-noise ratio – if
anything, it is reduced, explaining why difference scores are
generally lower in reliability than their components. The
Table 1 Intraclass correlations (ICCs) and standard errors of measurement (SEMs) for Studies 1 and 2. SEMs are in the measure’s original units (ms or
% correct). Primary indices of response control are highlighted in bold; 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Typical interpretations of ICC values
are: excellent (.8), good/substantial (.6), and moderate (.4) levels of reliability (Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981; Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977)
Task Measure ICCs SEMs
Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2
Flanker task Congruent RT .74 (.52–.86) .69 (.40 –.83) 24 (20–30) 20 (17–24)
Neutral RT .73 (.48–.86) .61 (.32–.78) 23 (19–29) 21 (18–26)
Incongruent RT .66 (.36–.81) .62 (.31–.79) 32 (27–40) 28 (24–35)
RT cost .40 (.12–.61) .57 (.36–.72) 15 (13–19) 15 (13–18)
Congruent errors .46 (.20–.66) .37 (.13–.58) 4.78 (3.97–6.0) 5.24 (4.43–6.43)
Neutral errors .45 (.19–.65) .39 (.14–.59) 4.95 (4.11–6.22) 5.16 (4.36–6.33)
Incongruent errors .71 (.54–.83) .58 (.34–.74) 4.67 (3.88–5.86) 5.76 (4.86–7.07)
Error cost .58 (.35–.74) .72 (.57–.83) 3.77 (3.14–4.74) 3.12 (2.64–3.83)
Stroop task Congruent RT .77 (.49–.88) .72 (.49–.84) 33 (27 –41) 31 (26–38)
Neutral RT .74 (.36–.88) .73 (.45–.86) 34 (28–43) 34 (28–41)
Incongruent RT .67 (.25–.85) .70 (.10–.88) 42 (35–52) 33 (28–40)
RT cost .60 (.31–.78) .66 (.26–.83) 21 (17–26) 24 (20–29)
Congruent errors .36 (.10–.58) .42 (.16–.62) 3.35 (2.78–4.20) 3.02 (2.55–3.71)
Neutral errors .45 (.19–.65) .51 (.25–.69) 3.52 (2.92–4.42) 3.17 (2.67–3.89)
Incongruent errors .62 (.40–.77) .39 (.15–.59) 3.78 (3.14–4.75) 3.89 (3.28–4.78)
Error cost .48 (.23–.67) .44 (.20–.63) 3.13 (2.60 –3.94) 2.45 (2.07–3.02)
Go/No-go task Go RT .74 (.58–.85) .63 (.44–.77) 31 (25–38) 37 (31–46)
Commission errors .76 (.58–.87) .76 (.60–.86) 5.36 (4.45–6.73) 6.46 (5.46–7.93)
Omission errors .69 (.51–.82) .42 (.19–.61) 1.52 (1.27–1.91) 3.73 (3.15–4.57)
Stop-signal task Go RT .35 (.08–.57) .57 (.28–.75) 107 (88–135) 57 (48–70)
Mean SSD .34 (.07–.57) .54 (.32–.70 ) 127 (105–161) 71 (60–88)
SSRT mean .47 (.21–.67) .43 (.19–.62) 32 (27–41) 28 (24–35)
SSRT integration .36 (.08–.59) .49 (.26–.66) 39 (32–49) 35 (29–43)
UPPS-P Negative U. .72 (.54–.83) .73 (.58–.83) .30 (.25–.38) .29 (.25–.36)
Premeditation .70 (.51–.82) .85 (.75–.91) .26 (.21–.32) .18 (.15–.22)
Perseverance .73 (.57–.84) .78 (.65–.86) .29 (.24–.36) .21 (.18–.26)
Sensation Seek. .87 (.78–.93) .89 (.82–.94) .24 (.20–.30) .21 (.18–.26)
Positive U. .80 (.66–.88) .81 (.70–.88) .25 (.21–.32) .29 (.24–.36)
RT reaction time, SSD Stop-Signal Delay, SSRT Stop-Signal Reaction Time, UPPS-P impulsive behavior scale
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equivalent plot for errors can be seen in Supplementary
Material E. We also plot the absolute variance components
in Supplementary Material E. In absolute terms, the total
amount of variance is reduced in the difference scores often
by a factor of 3 or 4 relative to their components. This is
desirable in an experimental task, in which any variation in
the effect of interest is detrimental.
How does accounting for reliability affect
between-task correlations?
As noted in the introduction, the reliability of two mea-
sures will attenuate the magnitude of the correlation that
can be observed between them. As an illustration of this
phenomenon, we examine the correlations between the
four response control tasks administered in Studies 1
and 2 before and after accounting for the reliability of
the measures. Response control provides a useful illustra-
tive example of this issue, as it is often assumed that a
common response control trait underlies performance on
these tasks (for a review, see Bari & Robbins, 2013),
though this assumption has received mixed support from
correlational research (Aichert et al., 2012; Cyders &
Coskunpinar, 2011; Fan, Flombaum, McCandliss,
Thomas, & Posner, 2003; Friedman & Miyake, 2004;
Hamilton et al., 2015; Ivanov, Newcorn, Morton, &
Tricamo, 2011; Khng & Lee, 2014; Scheres et al., 2004;
L. Sharma et al., 2014; Stahl et al., 2014; Wager et al.,
2005).
Spearman’s Rho correlations can be seen in Table 3. We
combined the data from Studies 1 and 2 tomaximize statistical
Table 2 Intraclass correlations (ICCs) and standard errors of measure-
ment (SEMs) for Study 3. SEMs are in the measure’s original units (ms or
% correct). Primary variables of interest are highlighted in bold; 95%
confidence intervals in parentheses. Typical interpretations of ICC values
are: excellent (.8), good/substantial (.6), and moderate (.4) levels of reli-
ability (Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981; Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977).
The Global precedence effect was calculated as local congruent RT –
global congruent RT
Measure ICC SEM
Posner task Valid RT .80 (.61–.90) 16 (13–20)
Invalid RT .79 (.56–.89) 21 (18–28)
Cueing effect .70 (.50–.83) 13 (10–16)
SNARC task Congruent RT .69 (.49–.82) 29 (24–37)
Incongruent RT .74 (.56–.86) 26 (21–33)
SNARC effect RT .22 (0–.49) 16 (13–21)
Congruent errors .67(.45–.81) 2.04 (1.67–2.62)
Incongruent errors .58 (.33–.75) 2.66 (2.18–3.42)
SNARC effect errors .03 (0–.34) 2.30 (1.88–2.95)
Navon task Local congruent RT .69 (.49–.83) 29 (24–38)
Local incongruent RT .68 (.45–.83) 30 (24–38)
Local RT cost .14 (0–.43) 19 (15–24)
Local congruent errors .56 (.30–.74) 1.23 (1.01–1.58)
Local incongruent errors .80 (.65–.89) 4.25 (3.48–5.46)
Local error cost .82 (.69–.90) 3.68 (3.01–4.72)
Global congruent RT .63 (.40–.78) 34 (28–43)
Global incongruent RT .70 (.50–.83) 30 (25–39)
Global RT cost 0 (0–.18) 14 (11–17)
Global congruent errors .60 (.36–.76) 2.22 (1.82–2.86)
Global incongruent errors .71 (.51–.84) 1.96 (1.61–2.52)
Global error cost .17 (0–.46) 2.67 (2.19–3.43)
Global precedence effect (RT) 0 (0–.29) 24 (20–31)
UPPS-P Negative U. .78 (.63–.88) 0.22 (0.18–0.29)
Premeditation .88 (.78–.93) 0.14 (0.12–0.18)
Perseverance .90 (.81–.94) 0.18 (0.14–0.23)
Sensation Seek. .91 (.83–.95) 0.16 (0.13–0.20)
Positive U. .85 (.67–.93) 0.20 (0.17–0.26)
RT reaction time, UPPS-P impulsive behavior scale, SNARC Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Code
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Fig. 4 Relative size of variance components for reaction time (RT) mea-
sures in Studies 1 and 2 (A: Total N=99–104) and Study 3 (B: N=40). The
size of the bar is normalized for the total amount of variance in the
measure (see Supplementary Material E), and subdivided into variance
accounted for by differences between participants (white), variance
accounted for by differences between sessions (e.g., practice effects,
gray), and error variance (black). The intraclass correlation (ICC) reflects
the proportion of the total variance attributed to variance between indi-
viduals, and is printed above each bar. SSD Stop-Signal Delay,SSRT Stop-
Signal Reaction Time, SNARC Spatial-Numerical Association of
Response Code
Table 3 Spearman’s rho correlations between measures of response control. Data are combined across Study 1 and 2 (total N = 99–104), and averaged
across sessions 1 and 2. Correlations significant at p<.05 are highlighted
Flanker RT cost Flanker Error cost Stroop RT cost Stroop Error cost Go/no-go Com.
Flanker RT cost
Flanker Error cost .29**
Stroop RT cost .14 -.14
Stroop Error cost -.10 -.01 .28**
Go/no-go Com. -.14 .18 -.14 .05




RT reaction time, Go/no-go Com. commission errors in the go/no-go task, SSRT Int. stop signal reaction time calculated using the integration method
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power. In order to examine the impact of reliability, in Table 4,
we also estimated the dissatenuated correlation coefficients
using Spearman’s (1904) formula:
}True}correlation x; yð Þ ¼ Samplecorrelation x; yð Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Reliability xð Þ:Reliability yð Þp
Spearman noted that the correlation that is observed be-
tween two measures will be attenuated (weakened) by mea-
surement error. Assuming that the reliability coefficient re-
flects the noise in each measure individually, he proposed
the disattenuation formula as a means to Bcorrect^ the corre-
lation obtained from a sample. As the formula depends on
sample estimates of the correlation and reliabilities, it is itself
an estimate, and not intended here for inference (for
discussions of interpretative issues, see Muchinsky, 1996;
Winne & Belfry, 1982). We present them to illustrate the im-
pact of reliability on theoretical conclusions, especially when
using the traditional approach of statistical thresholds, though
the attenuation of effect sizes is not unique to the null hypoth-
esis significance testing framework. For ease of comparison,
correlations significant at p<.05 are highlighted.
Focusing first on the observed correlations in Table 3 there
is little support for a relationship between these measures.
Consistent with some observations (Reynolds, Ortengren,
Richards, & de Wit, 2006), though inconsistent with others
(Aichert et al., 2012), we observed a strong correlation be-
tween SSRT and commission errors on the go/no-go task.
Otherwise, if we were making a dichotomous decision as to
whether different response control tasks were related, we
would fail to reject the null hypothesis by traditional
standards.
The disattenuated correlations in Table 4 paint a somewhat
different picture. Note that the dissatenuated correlation will
always be higher than the observed correlations when the
reliabilities are less than one. The increase in the correlations
in Table 4 is therefore unsurprising. If we apply the same
statistical thresholds however, the dissatenuated correlations
lead us to different qualitative conclusions about the relation-
ships between measures. Note that not all of these
relationships are consistent with a single underlying response
control construct. For example, whereas SSRT shows a posi-
tive correlation with flanker error costs, it shows a negative
correlation with flanker RT costs. These may suggest other
factors moderating the relationships between these measures,
such as speed-accuracy trade-offs that carry some consistency
across tasks.
For reference, we include the raw and disattenuated corre-
lations for the measures used in Study 3 in the Supplementary
Material F.
Discussion
Across many research, educational, or clinical contexts, when
finding a group level effect, it is often theoretically meaningful
to ask what factors of the individual predict effectiveness. It is
not intuitive, and rarely discussed, that such questions may be
at odds with each other because one requires low and one
requires high variability between individuals (Rogosa,
1988), even though the statistical issues have been long
known. The challenges highlighted by our data are also cause
to reflect upon the way in which researchers evaluate para-
digms for this purpose; it should not be assumed that robust
experimental paradigms will translate well to correlational
studies. In fact, they are likely to be sub-optimal for correla-
tional studies for the same reasons that they produce robust
experimental effects. Our findings, as well as observations
from elsewhere in the literature, indicate that this challenge
currently exists across most domains of cognitive neurosci-
ence and psychology (De Schryver, Hughes, Rosseel, & De
Houwer, 2016; Hahn et al., 2011; Lebel & Paunonen, 2011;
Ross et al., 2015). We discuss the practical and theoretical
implications of this below, including the way in which sub-
optimal reliabilities should be interpreted; the extent to
which these problems generalize to other populations;
and the challenge this poses to resource intensive research
such as neuroimaging, where it is not easy just to increase
participant numbers.
Table 4 Disattenuated Spearman’s rho correlations betweenmeasures of response control. Correlations that would be significant at p<.05 (N=100) are
highlighted
Flanker RT cost Flanker Error cost Stroop RT cost Stroop Error cost Go/no-go Com.
Flanker RT cost
Flanker Error cost .50*
Stroop RT cost .25* -.21*
Stroop Error cost -.20* -.02 .51*
Go/no-go Com. -.22* .25* -.21* .09
SSRT Int. -.31* .26* -.11 -.03 .90*
RT reaction time, Go/no-go Com. commission errors in the go/no-go task, SSRT Int. stop signal reaction time calculated using the integration method
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Translating experimental effects to correlational
studies
The reliability of a measure is an empirical question and a
prerequisite for effective correlational research. Clearly
reliability cannot be assumed on the basis of robustness
in within-subject contexts. Success in within-subject con-
texts does not necessarily exclude a task from consider-
ation in individual differences contexts, or vice versa.
Hypothetically, an effect could produce reliable between-
subject variation, but also a mean difference large enough
so that it can be consistently reproduced across different
samples. However, the reliabilities of many the measures
reported here, spanning the domains of attention, cogni-
tive control, and processing style, are much lower than
most researchers would expect, and fall short of outlined
standards (Barch et al., 2008; Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981;
Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977). There are direct im-
plications of this for initiatives recommending and
employing some of the measures we evaluated (e.g., the
Stroop and stop-signal tasks; Barch, Braver, Carter,
Poldrack, & Robbins, 2009; Hamilton et al., 2015), and
for the way in which experimental tasks are evaluated for
this purpose in the future.
It is important to emphasize that these results do not
indicate that these paradigms are not replicable, valid, or
robust measures of their respective constructs. For exam-
ple, the global precedence effect from the Navon task was
highly robust, and generally of a similar magnitude in
each session of each study. It also does not preclude the
use of these tasks for examining between-group differ-
ences in experimental designs. The difference between
group means may be sufficiently large so as to be detect-
able, for example, if one or both groups are located at
extreme points on the continuum. Rather, our results sug-
gest that these measures do not consistently distinguish
between individuals within a population. Such difficulties
with inter-task correlations and reliability have been
discussed previously in studies of executive functioning,
in the context of the Btask impurity^ problem (Friedman
& Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). Individual differ-
ences in a given task will likely capture only a subset of
Bexecutive functions,^ in addition to domain specific
mechanisms. Moreover, as Cronbach (1957) highlighted,
the goal of the experimentalist is to minimize individual
differences, and many of the tasks we examine come orig-
inally from this tradition. As a result, these tasks may tap
in to aspects of executive functioning that are relatively
consistent across individuals compared to those that dif-
ferentiate between them.
In noting that measures are constructed to achieve dif-
ferent aims in experimental and correlational research, we
can also consider whether it is problematic to attempt to
experimentally manipulate behavior on measures con-
structed to reliably measure individual differences. For
example, self-report measures such as the UPPS-P are
developed with the explicit purpose of assessing stable
traits (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), such that they should
be purposefully robust to natural or induced situational
variation. Nevertheless, some studies have looked at the
UPPS-P dimensions as outcome variables, for example, in
a longitudinal study on alcohol use (Kaizer, Bonsu,
Charnigo, Milich, & Lynam, 2016). As noted previously,
whether a measure is effective for a given aim is an em-
pirical question, though we believe these broader consid-
erations can provide useful guidance.
Difficulties with difference scores
Statistical concerns regarding the reliability of difference
scores in correlational research have been noted previous-
ly (Caruso, 2004; Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Lord, 1956).
Generally speaking, the difference between two measures
is less reliable than the individual measures themselves
when the measures are highly correlated and have similar
variance (Edwards, 2001; Rogosa, 1988, 1995; Willet,
1988; Zimmerman & Williams, 1998; Zumbo, 1999). In
part, this reflects the propagation of error from two com-
ponent measures to the composite score, but the main
reason is that any subtraction that successfully reduces
between-participant variance (and thus reduces Berror,^
as defined in experimental research) is likely to increase
the proportion of measurement error relative to between-
participant variance (see Fig. 4). In within-subject de-
signs, we often subtract a baseline of behavioral perfor-
mance or neural activity precisely because we expect
strong correlations between participants’ performance in
multiple conditions, and thus by definition the subtraction
will reduce between participant variance relative to error
variance. There are notable exceptions in our data with
the Flanker and Navon task error scores. Errors in con-
gruent trials in these tasks are uncommon, and there is
little variation in the baseline. As such, the difference
score primarily reflects incongruent errors. The same is
not true of RTs, where individuals strongly co-vary in
their responses to congruent and incongruent trials.
However, it does not follow that tasks without differ-
ence scores are preferable. In principle, subtracting a
baseline measure in order to control for unwanted
between-participant variance is not at odds with the goal
of examining individual differences in performance on
that task. After all, one wants to measure individual dif-
ferences in a specific factor, not just obtain any between-
participant variance. For example, simple and choice RTs
correlate with measures of general intelligence (Deary,
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Der, & Ford, 2001; Jensen, 1998). Omitting the baseline
subtraction from a task could produce between-task cor-
relations for this reason, but would not aid our under-
standing of the specific underlying mechanism(s).
The impact of reliability on statistical power –
is Bgood^ good enough?
The past decade has seen increasing attention paid to the
failure of the biomedical sciences to always appropriately
consider statistical power (Button et al., 2013b; Ioannidis,
2005). Reliability is a crucial consideration for power in
correlational research, and the importance of reliable mea-
surement has been emphasized in many landmark psycho-
metric texts (e.g., Guilford, 1954; Gulliksen, 1950;
Nunnally, 1970). Despite this, there are no definitive
guidelines for interpreting reliability values (Crocker &
Algina, 1986). While .6 is nominally considered good
by commonly cited criteria (Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981;
Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977), more conservative
criteria have been given as a requirement for the use of
cognitive tasks in treatment development, citing a mini-
mum of .7 and optimal value of .9 (Barch et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the issue of reliabil-
ity has been somewhat trivialised in contemporary person-
ality research, with one review noting that B…researchers
almost invariably concluded that their stability correla-
tions were ‘adequate’ or ‘satisfactory,’ regardless of the
size of the coefficient or the length of the retest interval.^
(Watson, 2004, p.326). Researchers might also assume
that RT-based measures are inherently more noisy than
self-report (e.g., Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald,
2007), and that holding all measures to a clinical standard
is overly restrictive (Nunnally, 1978). While there may be
some truth to these positions, it does not preclude consid-
eration of the implications of poor reliability.
An immediate consequence of a failure to consider
reliability in correlational studies is that effect sizes will
generally be underestimated. If a researcher conducts an
a priori power analysis without factoring in reliability,
they bias themselves towards finding a null effect. A less
intuitive consequence is that the published literature can
overestimate effects (Loken & Gelman, 2017). Though
on average correlation estimates are attenuated by mea-
surement error, noise can also produce spuriously high
correlations on occasion. When spuriously high estimates
are selected for by a bias to publish significant findings
the average published correlation becomes an overesti-
mate. In combination, these factors are challenges to
both reproducibility and theoretical advancement.
Consideration of reliability is not completely absent
from the cognit ive and imaging li terature (e.g. ,
Salthouse, McGuthry, & Hambrick, 1999; Shah, Cramer,
Ferguson, Birn, & Anderson, 2016; Yarkoni & Braver,
2010). However, our informal discussions with colleagues
and peers suggest that it is not routine to factor reliability
estimates into power analyses, and it is exceedingly rare
to see this reported explicitly in published power calcula-
tions. It is also potentially problematic that researchers
tend to underestimate the sample sizes necessary to detect
small effects (Bakker, Hartgerink, Wicherts, & van der
Maas, 2016). To illustrate these issues concretely,
Table 5 shows some numerical examples of the impact
of different reliabilities on sample size calculations. This
compares the sample size required for the assumed under-
lying correlation with that required for the attenuated cor-
relation. This calculation, sometimes attributed to
Nunnally (1970), rearranges Spearman’s (1904) correction
for attenuation formula that we applied earlier:
r measure A; measure Bð Þ ¼ r true A; true Bð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
reliability Measure Að Þreliability Measure Bð Þ
p
Two things are apparent from Table 5. First, the mag-
nitude of reliability for a measure has a substantial impact
on required sample sizes. Even for reliability nominally
considered to be Bgood^ (>.6) by commonly cited criteria
(Cicchetti & Sparrow, 1981; Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch,
1977), the required sample sizes are about three times
higher than what would be specified if reliability had
not been taken in to account. Second, even with moderate
(r = .3) true effect sizes assumed, the sample sizes
required greatly exceed those typically used in most cog-
nitive and neurophysiological research.
Challenges for cognitive neuroscience and clinical
research
Though the required sample sizes indicated in Table 5 are not
insurmountable in all research contexts, they are particularly
challenging for areas that are resource intensive, or access to
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participants is difficult. Concerns about measurement reliabil-
ity has also been raised in neuroimaging (e.g., Bennett &
Miller, 2010; Mikkelsen, Singh, Sumner, & Evans, 2015;
Vul, Harris, Wimkielman, & Pashler, 2009; Wang, Abdi,
Bakhadirov, Diaz-Arrastia, & Devous, 2012). For example,
it has been estimated that the average reliability of voxel-
wise blood-oxygen-level-dependent functional magnetic res-
onance imaging is .5 (Bennett & Miller, 2010). This is similar
to the average of the estimates for our behavioral measures
(.45). Assuming reliabilities of .5 for both measures and a
large (R= .5) Btrue^ underlying correlation, a sample size of
123 would be required to adequately power correlations be-
tween cognition and functional imaging. Such sample sizes
are rare, including in our own previous work (Boy, Evans,
et al., 2010; see also Yarkoni and Braver, 2010).
Given the prohibitive time and costs of behavioral, imag-
ing, and neuropsychological studies, one might question the
utility of pursuing individual differences research. It has been
argued that it is not optimal to pursue large sample sizes in
neuroimaging because effects that require large samples are
not sufficiently large to be of practical or theoretical impor-
tance (Friston, 2012, though see commentaries; Button et al.,
2013a; Friston, 2013; Ingre, 2013; Lindquist, Caffo, &
Crainiceanu, 2013). The extent to which an effect size is con-
sidered meaningful will vary according to the research ques-
tion, though there is little guidance on what our normative
expectations should be. A recent meta-analysis of 708
correlations in personality and behavioral research observed
that <3% of effects were large by Cohen’s (1988) commonly
cited criteria of .5, and 75% of effects were .29 and below
(Gignac & Szodorai, 2016). There is certainly a higher range
of effect sizes reported in imaging studies (e.g., Vul et al.,
2009), though it is likely that these are inflated by the preva-
lence of small samples, publication bias and questionable re-
search practices (Button et al., 2013b; John, Loewenstein, &
Prelec, 2012). Therefore, we believe that the effect sizes and
sample sizes reported in Table 5 are representative, even op-
timistic, for the ranges common to most research questions.
Measurement error or state-dependence
We have largely discussed issues of task construction and
measurement. An alternative possibility is that participants
simply fluctuate in their ability to perform these tasks over
time and contexts. There is evidence, for example, that
SSRTs are sensitive to strategic changes (Leotti & Wager,
2010), and that SSRTs and go/no-go performance are
disrupted by alcohol (e.g., Caswell, Morgan, & Duka, 2013;
de Wit, Crean, & Richards, 2000; Dougherty, Marsh-Richard,
Hatzis, Nouvion, & Mathias, 2008; Mulvihill, Skilling, &
VogelSprott, 1997; Weafer & Fillmore, 2008), indicating that
performance on these tasks is not impermeable.
Nevertheless, there is evidence for stability for some tasks
in our data. Low ICCs in a homogenous sample are not nec-
essarily indicative of substantial changes in performance. The
low SEMs in the flanker RT cost indicate that participants
generally perform the task similarly in both sessions, even
though the relative ranking between individuals is not consis-
tent. Further, if the low ICCs we observe were primarily due to
variation in psychological or physiological factors over the
course of 3 weeks, we might expect high reliabilities when
comparing performance in the first half of each session to the
second half, or comparing odd and even numbered trials.
However, these within-session reliabilities (Supplementary
Material G) show similarly sub-optimal reliability for the
key measures (see also Khng & Lee, 2014). An exception to
this is the stop-signal reaction time, where the odd vs. even
trial comparison produces estimates between .82 and .89 for
the integration method. This is likely in part because the track-
ing procedure used will produce a high reliability for the SSD
when taking alternating trials.
We would generally expect measurements taken closely
together in time to yield higher estimates of reliability than
those taken at more distant points, even within a single testing
session. However, there are sources of variance outside the
construct of interest that could increase or decrease reliability
estimates. Time-series analysis of RTs suggests that there is a
Table 5 The relationship between the true correlation, reliabilities, and
observable correlation in two variables. The BTrue r^ is the correlation we
would expect to observe given a reliability of 1 for both measures. The BN
true^ is the sample size that would be required to observe the underlying
effect, which is what is normally reported from power calculations. The
BObservable r^ is the expected correlation after accounting for reliability,
corresponding to a recalculated sample size requirement (N obs.). Power
calculations were performed usingG*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, &
Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), assuming α = .05
and β = .8
Reliability
True r Measure A Measure B Observable r N true N obs.
.7 .8 .8 .56 13 22
.7 .6 .6 .42 13 42
.7 .4 .7 .37 13 55
.5 .8 .8 .4 29 46
.5 .6 .6 .3 29 84
.5 .4 .7 .26 29 113
.3 .8 .8 .24 84 133
.3 .6 .6 .18 84 239
.3 .4 .7 .16 84 304
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correlation between the speeds of consecutive responses given
by an individual, which decreases as the number of interven-
ing trials increases (Gilden, Thornton, & Mallon, 1995;
Wagenmakers, Farrell, & Ratcliff, 2004). Estimates compar-
ing odd to even numbered trials may appear to be more reli-
able because they encompass such short-scale fluctuations.
Alternatively, factors such as practice effects or fatigue may
decrease reliability by increasing measurement error, or by
producing systematic shifts in performance between measure-
ment points (e.g., individuals being slower in the second half
of trials compared to the first). The analyses we conduct in
Supplementary Materials D and G explore these as possible
reasons for the sub-optimal reliabilities that we observed.
Taken together, these suggest that the key issue is simply that
individuals do not differ enough from one another to reliably
overcome measurement fluctuations.
Generalizability of findings to other populations.
If between-participant variance differs markedly between pop-
ulations, the population with higher variance will show higher
reliability, unless measurement noise increases proportionally.
We used a (predominantly female) student sample, who might
show restricted variance compared to a general population.
However, our comparisons indicate that they have similar levels
of variability to samples taken from a general population, which
also did not show consistently higher reliability estimates (see
Supplementary Material C1 and C2). Further, the components
of UPPS-P, a self-report measure of impulsivity, showed reli-
abilities between .7–.9, indicating that reliable measurement is
attainable in a student sample on measures designed to differ-
entiate between individuals. Finally, examples of sub-optimal
reliability for robust within-subject effects are not limited to
student samples (e.g., attention networks in schizophrenic
patients and healthy controls; Hahn et al., 2011). Therefore,
the issues we discuss are likely to generalize to other samples.
Though our sample sizes are larger than many previous
retest reliability studies of these tasks, it has been argued that
samples approaching 250 are necessary for a stable estimate of
the (Pearson’s) correlation effect size (Schonbrodt & Perugini,
2013). Using simulations, they defined stability as the point at
which the Bobserved^ correlation did not deviate from a spec-
ified window (±.1) around the Btrue^ effect with the addition
of more data points. However, the point of stability is depen-
dent on the size of the underlying correlation, and the degree
of uncertainty one is willing to accept. For example, assuming
a confidence (power) level of 80% and a population correla-
tion of R = .7, the point of stability for a window of ±.15 was
N=28. Therefore, ICCs as low as the ones we observe are
unlikely if the population ICC is excellent.
The student population we used is typical of most cognitive
and imaging studies, but regardless of population, the main
points of this paper will remain true: experimental designs aim
to minimize between-subject variance, and thus successful
tasks in that context should be expected to have low reliability;
taking reliability into account could entirely change theoreti-
cal inferences from correlational structure.
Future directions and recommendations
Our consideration of reliability issues form part of a broader
concern that studying individual differences is challenging for
laboratory-based research, particularly in resource-intensive
contexts such as neuroimaging. With these global issues in
mind, we discuss approaches that could help to optimize re-
search designs using cognitive tasks. Note that although the
majority of discussion focuses on analysis methods, one
should not expect to create inter-subject variability from a task
that is designed to produce homogenous performance.
Researchers should bemindful of these properties at the stages
of task design/selection and power analysis. For several of
these approaches, it is undetermined or untested whether they
improve reliability estimates for the contexts we focus on
here, though some have shown promise in other areas.
Alternative measurement approaches The independent ex-
amination of mean RTs or mean error rates belies the richness
of the data provided bymany behavioral tasks. The practice of
considering RT and errors costs as independent and inter-
changeable measures of performance has been questioned in
several areas (e.g., Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016; Ratcliff &
Rouder, 1998; Wickelgren, 1977). In the domain of task
switching, it has been suggested that composite scores of RT
costs and error rates are better able to predict performance in a
working memory task than RT costs alone (Draheim et al.,
2016; Hughes, Linck, Bowles, Koeth, & Bunting, 2014).
Further, Hughes et al. observed higher within-session reliabil-
ities for composite RT-accuracy scores, relative to RT costs or
accuracy costs in isolation, but only when using a response
deadline procedure.
Alternatively, mathematical models of decision making
such as the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff &
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016)
decompose RTand accuracy into parameters thought to reflect
decision processes. The combination of modelling techniques
with imaging methods has also been discussed (Forstmann,
Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Forstmann &Wagenmakers,
2015). Recently, Lerche and Voss (2017) observed that the
retest reliability of key diffusionmodel parameters was similar
to that of overall accuracy and mean RT in lexical decision,
recognition memory, and an associative priming task.
However, the parameters they extracted reflect processes
(e.g., information processing speed) in individual conditions
or across conditions, rather than a within-subject effect anal-
ogous to an RT cost. It is possible to create difference scores
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from model parameters, though these may be subject to the
same statistical issues noted previously. Thus, while there may
be theoretical value in such modelling approaches, whether
they improve reliability estimates for experimental effects is
an open question.
Another suggested alternative to difference scores is to use
residualized differences (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; DuBois,
1957; Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This entails a regression
approach in which scores in the baseline condition (e.g., con-
gruent RT) are used to predict incongruent RTs, and an indi-
vidual’s residual from their predicted value is taken as the
index of performance. Residualized scores show improved
reliability over standard difference scores in some situations,
though their interpretation is not straightforward (for a review,
see Willet, 1988). Evaluating the theoretical strengths and
weaknesses of all these approaches is beyond the scope of
the current paper. From a methodological perspective, the re-
liability of any composite measure or modelled parameter will
not be perfect, and thus needs to be empirically measured and
accounted for.
Alternative statistical approaches In our reliability analyses,
we adopted the ANOVA-based approach to estimating com-
ponents of variance (McGraw & Wong, 1996; Shrout &
Fleiss, 1979). This is perhaps the most commonly used meth-
od in psychology, produced by popular packages such as
SPSS. Variance components can alternatively be estimated
via the use of linear mixed-effects (LMMs) and generalized
linear mixed-effects models (GLLMs; Nakagawa &
Schielzeth, 2010). These models allow greater flexibility in
dealing with distributional assumptions and confounding var-
iables. Structural equation models have also grown increas-
ingly popular in psychology (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) as a
method to examine relationships between constructs theorized
to underlie observable behaviors (Anderson & Gerbing,
1988). Factor analysis and structural equation modelling have
been used previously to examine commonality among re-
sponse inhibition and executive functioning tasks (see, e.g.,
Aichert et al., 2012; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Stahl et al.,
2014). An attractive feature of this approach is they allow for
measurement error to be modelled separately from variance
shared between measures. Latent variable models have also
been applied to reliability estimates in the form of latent state-
trait models. (Newsom, 2015; Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999;
Steyer & Schmitt, 1990). They typically use data from three or
more sessions, and can dissociate variance that is stable across
sessions from session specific and residual (error) variance.
Notably, one study has also applied this approach to the pa-
rameters of the drift-diffusion model derived from multiple
tasks (Schubert, Frischkorn, Haemann, & Voss, 2016). A lim-
iting factor is that structural equation models typically require
large samples, with suggestions typically falling in the 100s
(c.f. Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). This, in
addition to the time required to administer multiple tasks or
sessions, may make the approach infeasible for many re-
searchers. Finally, Item Response Theory (IRT; see, e.g.,
Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991; Lord & Novick,
1968) has arguably superseded classical test theory in educa-
tional testing. The goal of IRT is to characterize the relation-
ship between typically a single latent trait (e.g., maths ability)
and the probability of a binary response (e.g., correct or incor-
rect) on individual test items. The resulting item response
curve captures both the location of each item with respect to
the latent trait (i.e., its difficulty), and the sensitivity of the
item to differing levels of ability (i.e., its slope). Though not
easily applicable to the current format of most experimental
tasks, the contribution of IRT to educational testing is notable
if constructing new tests for the purposes of cognitive and
clinical measurement.
Interactions in experimental designs In addition to factoring
reliability into power calculations as detailed above, within-
subject designs can be used to examine associations and dis-
sociations between measures. For example, the absence of
correlations in our data between SSRT and the Stroop task
implies no relationship between performance in these tasks.
In contrast, shared mechanisms have been implicated in ex-
perimental studies that have combined the tasks, where Stroop
stimuli are used in place of the typical two choice stimuli used
in the SST (Kalanthroff, Goldfarb, & Henik, 2013;
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004).
Verbruggen et al. observed longer SSRTs on incongruent trials
relative to neutral trials, suggesting that the mechanisms un-
derlying the resolution of conflict between stimuli overlaps
with the mechanisms underlying response inhibition in the
SST. Within-subject designs may be more appropriate to ex-
amine interactions and dissociations between underlying
mechanisms when individual differences per se are not the
primary focus (for further examples in cognitive control and
other areas, see, e.g., Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Boy, Husain,
et al., 2010; Hedge, Oberauer, & Leonards, 2015).
Conclusions
In concluding their prominent discussion of the reliability of
difference scores, Cronbach and Furby (1970) offered the ad-
vice, BIt appears that investigators who ask questions regard-
ing gain scores would ordinarily be better advised to frame
their questions in other ways^ (p. 80). This damning statement
has been qualified in subsequent work (Rogosa, 1988;
Zimmerman & Williams, 1998; Zumbo, 1999), though as il-
lustrated by our findings, robust experimental effects do not
necessarily translate to optimal methods of studying individ-
ual differences. We suggest that this is because experimental
designs have been developed and naturally selected for
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providing robust effects, which means low between-
participant variance. Cronbach (1957) called for a bridging
of the gap between experimental and correlational research
in psychology, and we support this goal. However, our find-
ings suggest more caution is required when translating tools
used to understand mechanisms in one context to the other.
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